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This paper examines the profit-shifting motive of a government trade policy and investigates the effects of vertical
structures and tariffs when markets are characterized by Cournot oligopolies. I also analyze the impact of
competition on the price and output decisions of upstream producers. The direct impact of a tariff in the upstream
sector of the market is to increase the price of the input which indirectly lowers domestic final good production and
thus, welfare. In particular I show that vertical integration affects the direction in which the domestic country aims to
switch trade flows by import tariffs. When foreign firms are vertically integrated downstream tariffs harm domestic
input producers by lowering both the input price and output. However, under non-integration a tariff on the final good
increases the domestic and foreign input supply. Increased competition in the upstream market has two effects.
First, it decreases the price at which the input is traded. Second, it also lowers the output of each domestic
intermediate good producer. Under intense competition in the upstream sector a tariff on intermediate good imports
lowers output.
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11. Introduction
The anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers have long been an issue of policy debate in
economics and antitrust, especially in markets were downstream firms depend on key inputs
supplied by a dominant vertically integrated firm. Theory suggests that vertical integration may
alter the pricing incentives of upstream firms which could result into market foreclosure1.
According to Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987), the strategic effect of vertical integration is to
“raise rivals’ cost” of production in the final good sector. A fundamental insight of this theory is
that vertical integration can reduce industry competition, raise prices of both intermediate and
final goods and thereby affect consumer welfare. Vertical integration can be viewed also as a
pre-emptive strategy that deters entry. On the other strand of the debate is the efficiency gain
issue. First, vertical mergers could result in the elimination of the double mark-up when a
downstream firm merges with a more efficient upstream firm by enabling the merged firm to
produce the same output at a lower cost.2 Second, vertical integration might shift output from
the less efficient fringe producer to the more efficient dominant firm. The impact of vertical
mergers from a welfare point of view is therefore not clear-cut as it offers little increasing
welfare trade-offs when mergers have both efficiency gains and anticompetitive effects. Thus
the welfare analysis of vertical integration requires accessing the relative importance of the
various effects.
In practice domestic competition among industries of varying degrees of integration raises a
number of antitrust questions. This is even evident when the industries involved have different
national identities. In this paper we are concerned with competition in the intermediate good
sector and government trade policy. Francois and Wooton (2000a) have shown that increasing
competition in the intermediate good sector have positive welfare effects on consumers of the
transported product. Brander and Spencer (1985) model of strategic trade policy has shown
that, the profit shifting effects of the use of subsidies could be welfare enhancing in a setting
where the home firm competes with a foreign rival in a Cournot-Nash quantity game in a third
market. However a legitimate argument for the use of export subsidy in this case requires a
very specific oligopolistic market structure. According to Eaton and Grossman (1986) the
nature and details of the optimal export policy conclusions are very sensitive to the
specification of the market structure and depend very much on the form of competition
between oligopoly firms. In a Bertrand duopoly where firms commit to prices they show that the
appropriate policy is a production or export tax. Dixit (1984) has extended the Brander and
1 Hart and Tirole (1990) and Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990)
2   See Perry (1990), Williamson (1979) and Salinger (1988) for discussions of these effects.
2Spencer model in a more general Cournot oligopoly where there are many firms and the home
market is also involved and established that in equilibrium an export subsidy is optimal only
when there are few domestic firms involved in the market. Horstman and Markusen (1986)
show the effects of free entry in eroding the gains from strategic trade policy. Dixit and
Grossman (1986) analyse the effects of subsidy when many oligopoly firms compete for a
scarce resources and show that strategic intervention may not be the most desirable policy if
this may cause the price of the scarce input to rise. Krugman (1984) allows for increasing
returns to scale at the margin in a multi-market Cournot competition model and concludes that
protection shifts the duopoly equilibrium to the home market’s favour by lowering the home
firm’s marginal cost which enables it to increases its market share to the disadvantage of the
foreign firm. In a similar study however Krishna (1989) show that the nature of the optimal
policy needed to correct for the divergence between price and marginal cost is dependent on
the extent of product differentiation assumed to exist in the market
Several papers3 have examined the optimal policy or effects of policy instruments on welfare
within an environment of imperfect competition. There have been extensions of this basic
model structure by integrating into it imperfectly competitive intermediate input markets.
Spencer and Jones (1991) examine trade and protection of a scarce national raw material in a
vertically related market, and show that an export restriction at the intermediate level can
increase a country’s exports of the final product. In this paper we present an analysis based on
a simple two-country model of international trade under imperfect competition to explain
vertical linkages between the intermediate good producers (upstream producer) and the final
good sector (downstream producers). More specifically, we examine the effects of the use of
tariffs (or subsidies) by the domestic government to strategically shift rents vertically or
horizontally.
In a similar paper Rodrik and Yoon (1989) show that a tariff placed on the imports of the input
by the domestic home government will be borne entirely by the foreign vertically-integrated firm
and will be welfare increasing. This is only evident if the foreign firm recognizes that any
increases in the price of the input would decrease its sales to zero. However, if the application
of the tariff by the domestic government increases the domestic price of the input, then an
internal solution occurs in which the intermediate product is both imported and produced
domestically. A tariff in this case would not act as a perfect rent-shifting device and could
actually reduce home country welfare.
3 Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa and Lee (1997) Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), Hokari, Hwang and Ohta (2003), Chang and Sugeta (2004),
Nese and Straume (2007), Yanasa and Kawabata (2008)
3In this paper we show first, when foreign firms are vertically-integrated, a tariff on input imports
could lead the foreign firm to shift their exports from the intermediate good to the final good.
Second, tariffs increase the domestic input price which indirectly lowers final good production
and thus, welfare. Third, upstream competition lowers the input price and output of each
domestic input producer. Under intense competition in the upstream sector a tariff on input
imports lowers output.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic features of the model. Section
3 sets out the equilibrium conditions in the upstream and the downstream sector of the
domestic market under non-integration in the presence of the domestic country tariff policy and
Section 4 discuses the effects of the tariffs on profit shifting in the input and the final good
market. Section 5 derives the comparative static effect of the imposition of a tariff by the
domestic government. Section 7 examines the market equilibrium conditions when the foreign
firm is vertically integrated. Section 8 looks at the vertical supply decisions of the foreign firm in
relation to domestic tariff policy. Section 9 provides the concluding remarks.
42. The Model
The basic model setting is illustrated in  Fig. 1.  In the domestic country and the foreign
 Fig. 1.  Market structure
country there are two vertically related activities where an upstream firm ( hU ) supplies an
intermediate input to a downstream firm ( hD ) in the domestic market. In line with Spencer and
Jones (1992), we compare this market structure to a foreign market where a vertically
integrated foreign firm (M) exports to the domestic country in the two markets.  Alternatively we
assume that a foreign monopoly firm ( fU ), exports only the input and another foreign firm
( fD ) produces and export the final good using its own input supplies. In this case we introduce
asymmetry in the ownership structure between the foreign and domestic firm by assuming that
only the foreign firm is vertically integrated. This asymmetry could stem from differences in
government policy which is evident in differences in antitrust policies among countries. To keep
the analysis fairly simply we assume there is no consumption of the good in the exporting
country. We attempt to highlight a situation where a downstream firm depends on a key input
from an upstream firm in the domestic or foreign country.
In this paper we assume static competition between upstream firms and downstream firms
where the firms produce a homogenous good and use quantities as their strategic variables.
Downstream firms take the price of the intermediate input and the output of its rival as given.
Home Country Foreign Country
                                                                                                 Firm Mdomestic Cournot final-good market
m domestic final-good producers
firms hD
domestic Cournot intermediate-good
market
k domestic intermediate-good
producers firms hU
n final-good exporters firms fD
g intermediate-good exporters
firms fU
5By an appropriate choice of units, the technology of production is simplified by assuming that
one unit of intermediate input is required to produce one unit of the final good and there are no
other factors of production. Without loss of generality we assume foreign and domestic markets
to be segmented. Therefore, since marginal cost is assumed to be constant, each market could
be independently analysed.
In what follows we consider two stages of decision. In stage 1, the foreign firm and the
domestic firm commit to the quantities of the intermediate good to supply to the domestic
market, so as to maximize profits taken rival’s output as given. In stage 2, the domestic final
good producers and the foreign firm set the output levels of the final good so as to maximize
profits taking rivals output and the input price ( r ) as given. The input price is therefore the
domestic market-clearing price which equates domestic demand by the final good producers to
the supply. As usual this game is solved by backward induction.
3. Market Equilibrium
This section sets out to analyse the equilibrium conditions in the domestic country downstream
(final good) and the upstream markets (intermediate good) under non-integration. This analysis
is quite relevant because vertically integrated firms will have incentives that differ from those of
non-integrated firms when competing in the downstream and upstream market. We further
develop the effects of a tariff on the export decisions of the foreign firm in the input and final
good market.
3.1 Downstream Market
Let hy and fy  be the domestic firm and the foreign firm production of the final good
respectively. We assume the inverse demand function of the final good to be )(Ypp ?  where
0)( ?? Yp . In this paper we assume a linear demand function for the final good as follows:
fh yyp ??? ???  where? , ?  and ?  are parameters. In this set up we assume ?? ?  which
means domestic and foreign products are perfect substitutes. Since ?? ?  determines the
degree of product differentiation, when ?? ? , then the domestic and foreign products are
imperfect substitutes. Total output is represented as fh mynyY ?? . Letting t denote tariff
applied to final good imports by the domestic country, a typical domestic firm and a foreign firm
will then choose output to maximize the following profits:
6hhh ycrp )( ????      (1)
fff yctp )( ????                              (2)
where hc  and fc are the constant marginal cost of the domestic and the foreign final good
producers respectively. We assume that 0?? fh cc 4. Firms are assumed to determine the
quantity of final good to produce taking the output of the other firm and the input price as given.
We examine the second stage Cournot equilibrium for the final good. The first-order conditions
for profit maximization are given as follows:
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In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium the output of each downstream firm as a function of r  and t  is
given as:
? ?rmmt
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D
y f )1(1 ????                                           (5)
where 0)1( ???? ?nmD . For strategic policy considerations by governments, equation (5)
indicates that a tariff by the domestic government would increase the home firm production of
the final good. This is because higher values of t  results in increased output by domestic firms
while output of the foreign firm decreases. The idea is simple, the introduction of the tariff by
the home government increases the marginal cost incurred by the foreign firm. This makes the
foreign firm to decrease its production of the final good for a given output of its rival. Thus the
tariff shifts rents horizontally towards domestic firms. That is why tariffs are an attractive policy
option for the domestic government. An increase in the tariff increases the output of the home
firm and decreases that of the foreign rival. Consequently, the home firms’ market share
expands at the cost of the foreign rival.
4 This assumption is made for the sake of technical simplicity, as this may not qualitatively affect the result.
73.2 Upstream Market
We next consider the intermediate good market. In the domestic country there are k identical
firms that produce the intermediate good dx . In the foreign country there are g identical firms
that produce and export output Fx  of the intermediate input to the home market. Firms are
engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition and aggregate input supply in the domestic country is
given by Fd gxkxX ??  where dkx  is total domestic production and Fgx  represents total
foreign exports. In the first stage, both the domestic input producer and the foreign firm
determine the price of the intermediate good r  charged to the downstream firms to maximize
profits taking into consideration the outcome of the second-stage game given by (5). Equating
domestic input demand with the supply (i.e. Fdh gxkxXny ??? )  the derived demand from (5)
is:
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Letting domestic policy towards the intermediate good be a specific import tariff T (a subsidy, if
negative), the profits of the domestic intermediate good producers and that of the foreign
intermediate good producers are represented as follows:
ddd xcr )( ???                              (7)
FFF xTcr )( ????                  (8)
where we assume 0?? Fd cc . The first order conditions for profit maximization of (7) and (8)
are:
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8In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, assuming there is an interior solution where the intermediate
goods market is supplied by both domestic production and imports, the output of the
intermediate good is:
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This yields an equilibrium price of the intermediate good and the final good as:
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 with a corresponding equilibrium outputs of the final good given as follows:
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Total equilibrium supply of both the intermediate good and the final good are represented as
follows:
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94. Tariff Policy and Profit-Shifting
Generally competing firms in importing country experience an increase in profit, whenever the
effect of a tariff leads to a decrease in export by the foreign firm.5 A tariff on both the
intermediate and the final good sector tends to increase the domestic price of both goods for
any given level of output by other producers. Under Cournot competition, an import tariff is a
successful profit-shifting device because the market share of the protected firm increases at
the expense of the rival firm.6
In this section we examine the rent-shifting effect of tariffs in both the upstream and
downstream sector of the industry. A unilateral application of a tariff by the domestic country in
the upstream market affects the price of the input by increasing it. However the output of the
domestic input production increases in (11) whiles that of foreign input production falls. There
is therefore a rent-shifting effect when tariffs are applied to the intermediate good sector.
However in equation (15) output of the final product is decreasing in own marginal cost of
increases in the input price. Thus while domestic production of the final good decreases,
foreign production of the final good increases (16). In this case a tariff policy applied to the
domestic intermediate good sector may have a direct positive rent-shifting effect, but an
indirect consequence of reducing domestic final-good production.
A higher tariff on the downstream sector increases the output of both the domestic and the
foreign intermediate good producers. However, whiles the intermediate good price increases,
this does not affect the output of the domestic final good production, it also increases. Under
this scenario the domestic final good firms increase at the cost of the foreign firms. This is
because an increase in the tariff increases the marginal cost faced by the foreign exporters of
the final product. Thus, there is a horizontal rent-shifting effect in favour of domestic firms. A
domestic final good output expansion implies that the derived demand facing the upstream
producers shifts outwards, causing both equilibrium output of the intermediate good and the
price to increase. In effect downstream tariff increases the price and the output of the
intermediate product and the final good, thereby increasing the profits of domestic upstream
and the downstream firms. This is confirmed by deriving the expressions for the equilibrium
profits. Setting 0?T  equilibrium profits are represented as follows:
5 Gruenspecht (1988)
6 Brander and Spencer (1985)
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A tariff applied to the downstream sector in this model mirrors the standard strategic trade
policy of Brander and Spencer (1985) where an export subsidy is optimal in the policy game.
The domestic government therefore has an incentive to take prior policy action that alters the
strategic interaction between foreign and domestic firms. In this case, a tariff policy on final
good imports implies both a terms-of-trade and a profit-shifting effect to local firms. Thus, terms
of trade and profit-shifting effects therefore could be viewed as a rational for trade policy
intervention.
5. A tariff on the Intermediate Good Imports: Comparative Static Analysis
To derive the comparative static effects of a tariff on the intermediate good imports we would
assume as usual that, the second order conditions for profit maximization hold and the Cournot
equilibrium is unique and that one firm’s marginal profit declines with an increase in the output
of the other firm (see Bulow et al, 1985). That is, 0??
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When we assume that the domestic policy towards the intermediate good sector involves an
import tariff, then the impact of an increase in the tariff rate on the quantities supplied is found
by totally differentiating the home market equations (9) and (10) to obtain:
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The solution is obtained by matrix inversion
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where 0)1( 2 ???? ?gkD .
The effects of the import tariff on the output produced by both domestic and foreign firms are
similar to Brander and Spencer type models of strategic trade policy. Since the tariff increases
the foreign intermediate good production cost, they affect negatively the foreign firm’s output
and positively the domestic input producers. The impact of the tariff is to directly decrease the
total input supply (17), increase the price of the input (13) which indirectly negatively affects the
total supply of the final good (18).
We know that an imposition of a tariff by the domestic government in the upstream market is to
increase the price of the intermediate good (i.e. 0)1( ???
?
??
? ????
D
kg
dT
dr ??? ), thus a comparative static
analysis effect of a change in the input price on domestic final good producers is to lower
output, 0)1( ???
D
m
dr
dyh ? . On the other hand output of the foreign final good producers rather
increases 0???
D
n
dr
dy f ? . Thus a policy designed to protect the domestic intermediate good
producers here has an indirect effect on the domestic final good producers.
Table 1: Comparative static effect of government tariff on output produced under non-integration in the home
country
Input production Final-good production
Domestic
output
Foreign
output
Total input
production Domestic
output
Foreign
output
Total final-good
production
Government Policy
)( dx )( Fx )(X )( hy )( fy )(Y
Tariff on intermediate input + - - - + -
Tariff on final good + + - + - -
6. Upstream Competition
Interest in this issue arises from the commonly expressed view that to promote competition in
the final good production, the intermediate good sector has to be protected to prevent
12
excessive entry so as to keep the home industry strong enough to withstand foreign
competition. An example of such protection is the United States’ anti-dumping tariff on
computer chips (DRAM) imported from Korean companies in 1993.7 To protect local production
of inputs some governments also regulate the intermediate good sector by requiring that
foreign firms located in the home market use a certain given proportion of locally manufactured
inputs. This is known in the literature as Local Content Requirement (LCR). The growing
importance of rules of origin with the creation of regional trade blocs such as the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) provides an example of such LCRs. The aim is to
enhance the competitive position of both the domestic intermediate and the final good
producers. However on the other strand of the argument is the view that encouraging
competition in the intermediate good sector lowers the price of the input, increase the output of
final good producers and therefore increase welfare. Thus the existence of competition
therefore makes the domestic anti-trust policy unnecessary.
To see the effects of competition in the intermediate good sector on the price of the input, we
differentiate (13) with respect to k to get:
? ?
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dr                                        (23)
which is negative, from (23) when the number of foreign intermediate good firms is held fixed a
change in the number of home intermediate good firms lower the price of the intermediate
input. Similarly the output of the intermediate good also decreases, inferring from (22) and
using (11) this can be written as follows:
? ? dk
nmgk
Tmgmtndxd ?)1()1(
)1(
2 ????
?????                                                                                                   (24)
 Increased competition in the domestic intermediate good market therefore has two effects.
First, it increases the number of input suppliers which, other things equal lowers the price at
which the input is traded. Second, increased competition lowers the output of the each
domestic intermediate good producer. It is evident from (23) and (24) that with falling prices
and lower output profits of each intermediate good firm fall. Under intense competition in the
intermediate good sector a tariff on intermediate good imports has the same effect, it lowers
7 Ishikawa and Lee (1997)
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output. In this sense competition policy acts as a substitute for strategic trade policy, laa`
Brander and Spencer (1985).
Total input supply ( Fd gxkxX ?? ) on the other hand increases as the number of input producers
increase. That is,
Fdd gdxdkxkdxdX ???
with the linear example using (22) we obtain
? ?
? ??)1())(1()()1(
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?????????
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dkTmgmtndxd                                                                     (25)
Whiles an increase in the number of intermediate good firms decreases the output of each firm
(24), on the other hand the overall total output of the intermediate good producers increases.
With lower input prices, domestic output of the final good increases. Thus competition in the
intermediate good sector benefits the domestic final good producers and improves domestic
welfare, this is because whenever the total supply of the final good rises, consumers gain.
7. Vertical Integration
To examine the effects of vertical integration on the production decisions of each domestic and
foreign firm, we consider the case where only the foreign firm is vertically-integrated. This
section therefore looks at the situation where the intermediate good and the final good are
produced and exported to the domestic market by a single foreign firm labelled as firm M. We
still maintain the same game analysed in the case of non-integration.
7.1 Downstream Market
Similarly letting t denote tariff applied to final good imports by the domestic country, the
domestic and the foreign final good firm will choose output to maximize the following profits:
hhh ycrp )( ????                                                                                                  (26)
FFffFfM xTcryctp )()( ???????? ???                (27)
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In (27) the profit of the vertically-integrated foreign firm includes the profits it earns in the export
of the intermediate good to the domestic market. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the
downstream sector when the foreign firm is integrated is similar to the case under non-
integration. The derived demand for the input remains unchanged.
7.2 Upstream Market
The profit of the domestic firm is presented as follows
dxcr )( ??? .                (28)
The profit function of the foreign vertically integrated firm is the same as in (27). Under vertical
integration the first-order conditions for the home firm and the foreign intermediate good firm is
as follows:
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives and ff yyp ????  in the linear example. The first term
in (30) is the marginal revenue less marginal cost of intermediate good export by the foreign
firm. The second term is the strategic term which measures the effect of an increase in output
of the intermediate good on profits earned by the foreign firm on final good exports given the
price r charged for the intermediate good. Joint control of the two exports markets gives firm
(M) the additional consideration of the strategic effect. Thus the integrated firm anticipates
losses to be incurred on the downstream sector as its intermediate product export increases.
The integrated firm (M), would be more accommodating in the upstream sector of the market
and would therefore export less of the intermediate good relative to the firm ( fD ).
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Under vertical integration the equilibrium values are as follows:
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8. Vertical Supply Decision and Domestic Country Policies
In this section we will follow Spencer and Jones’s (1991) analysis of an international duopoly in
which a vertically-integrated foreign firm produces a key intermediate product at a lower cost
than the domestic firm and competes with the domestic firm in a Cournot market for the final
product. Spencer and Jones show how trade in the intermediate input can arise as an
equilibrium in such a framework. They analyse the strategic behaviour of the vertically
integrated firm in the presence of the government trade policy and suggested the possibility
that an export subsidy would be desirable on both the input and on the final good. This section
however differs from that of Spencer and Jones in that, while they consider policies of the
government of the integrated firm as well as the vertical supply and vertical foreclosure
decisions of the foreign firm, we rather carry out our analysis from the perspective of the non-
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integrated firm and its home government policies i.e. tariff on both intermediate and final good
import.
According to Spencer and Jones (1992) the export decisions of firm (M) depends critically on
profit margins earned in the export of the intermediate good and the final good to the domestic
market evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium. Thus using first order conditions (4), equation (30)
can be rewritten as:
rxtpTr F ?????? )()(    (38)
From (38) the foreign integrated firm would export both the intermediate good and the final
good if and only if the profit margin from the export of the intermediate good exceeds the gain
from final good exports. However examining this condition from the perspective of the domestic
firm, it is evident that the domestic firm will enter the market for the final good if and only if the
profits of final good sales exceed that of intermediate good sales ( dh ?? ? ) which means that
rp ? . If )( tp ?  is therefore the profits earned from final good export by the firm (M) and
)( Tr ?  from intermediate good exports, it could be the case that final good sales fytp )( ?
exceeds that on intermediate-good sales FxTr )( ? . The foreign firm at the margin would prefer
to export more of the final good but less of the intermediate-good. Thus any further increases
in r  by the foreign firm would result in vertical foreclosure where imports are driven to zero
( 0?Fx ). Setting 0?t  and 0?T  we see from Eq (38) that when imports are forced to zero the
foreclosure price given as pr  is equal to p . The foreign firm would vertically supply the inputs
to the domestic firm if and only if any reduction in r  below the foreclosure price would increase
its overall profits.8 However if prr ?  then vertical foreclosure occurs as imports become
prohibitively expensive and 0?Fx .
Domestic government policies and the cost of input production are factors that also determine
whether foreclosure occurs or not. As Spencer and Jones (1989) show, vertical foreclosure of
the input may occur if it would “raise rivals’ cost” of production in the final good market and
also, when marginal cost of input production is sharply increasing. As shown by (32), increases
in the level of the tariff on intermediate good imports lowers foreign exports of the input. At an
excessively higher tariff rates imports could be driven to zero ( 0?Fx ). To induce vertical
supply of the input a tariff on the final good imports increases the supply of the input by the
8 See Spencer and Jones (1991) for a detailed discussion of this issue
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vertically integrated foreign firm ? ?32..equationcf . This situation arises because of the
presence of the strategic effect, an increase in the tariff increase the cost of this effect.
However, because the strategic effect is negative this is the same as a decrease in the
marginal cost of the foreign vertically integrated firm leading to an increase in intermediate
good exports see equation ? ?30.. equationcf .
Examining the domestic government tariff policy under non-integration shows that a tariff on
final good import increases both domestic firm and the foreign firm intermediate good output,
however the same is not true under vertical integration. From Eq. (31), an increase in the level
of the tariff on the final good would raise the domestic supply of the intermediate good if and
only if 0?? mg  hold. That is when foreign final good exports exceed input supply. Intuitively,
since increases in the level of the tariff on the final good increases the marginal cost of final
good exports, the vertical integrated firm will reduce the final good export and raise the export
of the intermediate good, see (32). Domestic input production is therefore likely to fall. Thus a
tariff on the final good by the domestic government is an effective instrument in protecting
domestic final good producers against foreign competition.
The effect of an increase in the level of the tariff in the intermediate good market under vertical
integration is similar to that of non-integration examined in section 3.2. However when firms are
vertically integrated downstream tariff lowers the price of the intermediate good (34) and
domestic input production (31). Profit of input producers falls, whiles profit of domestic final
good producers rather increases.
Conclusion
We have considered a domestic market that is served by a domestic firm and a foreign
vertically integrated firm characterised by Cournot competition in the presence of government
tariff policy in the upstream and downstream sector of the market. We examined the effect of
this policy on the profits of the domestic input and final good producers and the vertical supply
decisions of the foreign vertically integrated firm, but the main focus of the paper has been to
demonstrate that tariff policy designed to protect the upstream producers has an indirect effect
of lowering domestic production of the final good. This is because output of domestic final good
producers falls whiles output of the foreign firm rather increases thereby increasing the profit of
foreign firms to the disadvantage of domestic firms. Thus restriction of input trade not only
affects prices in that market but disturbs conditions in the final good’s market as well, and
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these indirect effects must be taken into consideration in determining what is optimal in terms
of national welfare.
One interesting result of this paper is that vertical integration affects the direction in which
policy by the importing country aims to switch trade flows. If the industries in both countries are
not integrated, then a domestic tariff policy on final goods import increases both local and
foreign input supply. However under vertical integration where the foreign firm has joint control
over the input and final good market, domestic input production falls while the foreign export of
the input increases. Vertical supply of the input is induced by a tariff on the final good. This shift
in the supply of the input is possible when the marginal cost of the final good export is
increasing due to the tariff.
Extending the result obtained in the previous literature on competition in the upstream market,
we have shown that increased competition in the domestic upstream market lowers the price of
the input and the output of each firm. However output of the industry as a whole increases.
This indicates that as the number of domestic upstream firms increases, each individual
upstream firm becomes relatively smaller (its Cournot output declines), but total industry output
increases thereby lowering prices of the input.
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